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Abstrakt
Cílem této práce je nastudovat a zjednodušeně popsat standardy SCAP používané pro stan-
dardizované předávání informací o zranitelnostech a dalších dat souvisejících s informační
bezpečností, se zaměřením na formáty XCCDF a OVAL. V textu jsou zkoumány existující
přístupy a nástroje sloužící k tvorbě obsahu těchto standardů. Na základě získaných poz-
natků je navržen nový nástroj s cílem řešit nedostatky existujících přístupů. Text práce
také popisuje implementaci a testování navrženého nástroje.
Abstract
The aim of this work is to study and describe the SCAP security standards in a simple
way with focus on the XCCDF and OVAL formats. State-of-the-art editors and content
development approaches are described and their benefits together with shortcomings are
identified. Based on the obtained knowledge, a new content editor design is proposed to
minimize the shortcomings of the known approaches. Implementation and testing of the
proposed editor are described.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the growing application of computers, the importance of computer security increases
as well. Computers are used in critical tasks and an intentional failure of such systems
could have fatal consequences. For such systems several configuration recommendations
and checklists exist to help their administrators analyze possible vulnerabilities and harden
the security of such systems. This implies that communication is very important in the
field of computer security.
Communication between people, people and computers as well as between computers is
necessary. Since various products from various vendors exist, standardization is required for
unification of the communication. Compliance with standards guarantees that the product
will be able to communicate with other products. Such standards are set by the Secu-
rity Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) standards, which cover a set of languages and
format specifications that are intended for communication of security-related content such
as information about vulnerabilities, system configuration or platform specification. The
Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) and Open Vulnerability
and Assessment Language (OVAL) are part of the SCAP protocol family and serve for dis-
tributing configuration checklists for important systems. Since quite complex information
needs to be communicated, the languages and formats of the SCAP family are not and
cannot be straightforward. This is a major shortcoming as document files in the SCAP
formats are not easily editable by humans. The checklists are created manually based on
recommendation documents written in a natural language. This need for manual SCAP
content creation together with its complexity cause a major problem.
Several tools that simplify the XCCDF and OVAL editing exist; however, they are
either simple and thus solve the problem only partially or too complex or contain a large
number of bugs which makes them unusable. This is probably caused by the fact that the
community of the SCAP content authors is relatively small. In this thesis, I attempt to
design an improved editor for the XCCDF and OVAL formats and so fill in the gap between
the currently available editors and the editing of the SCAP content files as approached in
general purpose editors. The XCCDF and OVAL formats are a subset of the XML language,
so the documents can be edited directly and the new editor is supposed to simplify this
process. The editor could help the user identify the elements and attributes that are allowed
at the given cursor position. But other requirements for a SCAP content creator should be
considered as well; These include, for example, fetching the current project state from git
or creating a patch from the introduced changes. These tasks could be also partially solved
by the editor.
In this thesis, the motivation for standardization in the field of information security is
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introduced together with the SCAP standard family. Special focus is put on the XCCDF
and OVAL formats. The existing approaches to editing of the formats and the relevant
editors are described, evaluated, compared. Based on the outcome of the evaluation, the
design of the new editor is proposed and implemented using the iterative software devel-
opment model. Testing of the implemented tool is described and the implemented editor
evaluated.
1.1 Structure
This document is divided into five main chapters. In the first chapter, the basic terms
of computer security are introduced and the need for standardization is explained. The
second chapter introduces the SCAP standards, and the XCCDF and the OVAL formats.
The space dedicated to the description of the formats is rather small and the descriptions
are rather brief as this text does not aspire to provide a complete and authoritative protocol
specifications. The aim of the second chapter is to merely give the reader basic knowledge
about formats which are to be edited with the tool that will be designed in the next chapters.
A brief overview of projects producing the SCAP content is provided as well.
In the third chapter, the existing approaches to content editing and tools are described
along with their benefits and shortcomings. It is here that I compare the scap-workbench,
eSCAPe, Benchmark Editor and Recommendation Tracker editors as well as a general
purpose editor used for SCAP content editing. In the fourth chapter, a new editor design
is proposed with the goal to minimize the discovered shortcoming of the state-of-the-art
editors. A summary of requirements for the new editor as well as the first iteration of
the iterative development model outputs is presented in the form of a use-case and class
diagram.
The fifth chapter describes the implemented editor. Differences from the originally
proposed solution are described and explained. The implemented object-oriented design is
presented and solutions to problems that arose during the development phase are discussed.
Testing of the implemented tool is also described in the fifth chapter.
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Chapter 2
Motivation
2.1 Introduction to the information security
Various definitions of the term “computer security
”
exist. For this thesis the following is
of relevance: Computer security is the protection afforded to an automated information
system in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability
and confidentiality of information system resources (includes hardware, software, firmware,
information/data, and telecommunications) [8].
The above definition claims that computer security is based on several basic concepts.
Let’s focus on the concepts of confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Confidentiality is the concealment of information or resources [4]. Confidentiality plays
a crucial role in the military and industrial applications of information technology, because
disclosure of military or industrial secrets can bring huge advantage to competitors and
cause harm with serious impact on reputation, revenue loss or even danger to human lives.
Another important concept of the information security is integrity. Integrity refers to the
trustworthiness of data or resources, and it is usually phrased in terms of preventing im-
proper or unauthorized change [4]. Information integrity also plays an important role in
security since many real world entities and processes rely on the correctness and trustwor-
thiness of the information obtained from computers. If the information is incorrect, serious
harm may also be done. The third important concept of security is availability. Availability
refers to the ability to use the information or resource desired [4]. If the user is not able to
use the system, the effect is the same as if there was no system in place at all, which also
implies possible serious consequences.
The information security also deals with assets, threads, attacks and vulnerabilities.
Assets include the information, software, personnel and hardware. The value of an asset
consists of its intrinsic value and the near-term impacts and long-term consequences of
its compromise [8]. A thread is a potential violation of security. The violation need not
actually occur for there to be a threat [4]. If such violation occurs, it is called an attack. A
vulnerability is a condition or weakness in or in absence of security procedures, technical
controls, physical controls, or other controls that could be exploited by a thread [8].
2.2 Standardization
The GNU/Linux operating system is being developed using the open-source model. This
fact has both positive and negative impact on the security aspects of the GNU/Linux
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operating system. Everyone from the general public can see the source code, so the positive
aspect is everyone can join the development and testing, and improve the security of the
operating system. On the other hand, the availability of the source code makes it easier
for attackers to find vulnerabilities. The open-source model does not bring the majority of
security problems and vulnerabilities to the GNU/Linux operating system, the majority of
the security flaws is caused by wrong system configuration [3].
This is good news since configuration problems can be relatively easily fixed. Configu-
ration recommendations can be created by and offered to system administrators to fix these
vulnerabilities caused by software misconfiguration. Various subjects like government agen-
cies or communities of professionals may produce such recommendations, which brings us
to the need of standardization. If every configuration recommendations producer used dif-
ferent format, it would be difficult for system administrators to deal with different formats
of such recommendations.
The standardized formats of the SCAP format family described in the next chapter solve
this problem. The producers of configuration recommendations, called the SCAP content,
may use this set of unified formats which brings the benefit of more efficient communica-
tion of such information. With the standardized formats, tools for automated checking of
the compliance with the configuration recommendations and with problems fixing can be
created. The OpenSCAP tool is a great example of such a tool. The disadvantage of the
SCAP format standards is the complexity of their specification, which results in the need of
manual creating the SCAP content. Creating of such content involves a lot of effort. The
aim of this work is to minimize this effort by designing and implementing new approaches
which would significantly ease the creation and modification of SCAP content.
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Chapter 3
The SCAP standards
The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) is a set of language and format specifi-
cations designed for describing security related information like security flaw, benchmarks,
system configuration, platform specification and measurement. It consists of following spec-
ifications [14].
• The Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF), a language for
creating security benchmarks, benchmark evaluation and reporting results
• The Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL), a language for represent-
ing and checking of system configuration and reporting machine state
• The Open Checklist Interactive language (OCIL), a language for collecting existing
data either from data stores or people
• The Asset Reporting Format (ARF), a format for representing information about
assets and relationships between reports and assets
• The Asset Identification (AI), a format for unique asset identification
• The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE), a dictionary of hardware, operating
systems and applications
• The Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE), a dictionary of software configura-
tions
• The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), a dictionary of software flaws
with impact on security
• The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), a system for measuring the sever-
ity of software vulnerabilities
• The Common Configuration Scoring System (CCSS), a system for measuring the
severity of security configuration issues
• The Trust Model for Security Automation Data (TMSAD), specification for using the
trust model of digital signatures in security automation specifications
The OCIL language is used for checking of the rules which cannot be expressed in the
OVAL language because they cannot be automated since collection of such rules requires
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human interaction. Such situation may occur when software which has to be checked does
not provide an API suitable for performing the check; another example is when the user is
asked to provide a number written on a label on physical hardware. The OCIL language
is a subset of the XML language as several other formats belonging to the SCAP protocol
family. The OCIL language is not used in this thesis, therefore no further details are
provided.
The Asset Identification (AI) is used for unique identification of assets. The Asset
Identification specification describes a framework that proposes how asset management
processes and other specifications may identify assets using a set of information known
or generated about the asset [18]. The AI is defined as a subset of the XML language
and defines support for assets like persons, systems, databases or data. The ARF is the
transport format of the information about assets and the relationships between assets and
reports. An asset report is a collection of content (or a link to content) about an asset [9].
The ARF deals with assets, reports, report requests and relations between them, and is
also defined as a subset of the XML language.
The CPE enumeration is used for unique platform specification. The CPE enumeration
internally uses an unordered set of attribute-value pairs that collectively describe or identify
a software application, an operating system or a hardware device [6] called Well-Formatted
Name (WFN). Only attributes from a defined set are allowed in the WFN format, including
the vendor, product, version, update or edition attributes. The values can be either logical
values or strings. The WFN format is used only internally in the CPE format specification
and is not intended to be used for communication. A CPE entry takes the form of a Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI) and algorithms for binding the WFN format to a URI and vice
versa are defined in the specification of the CPE format [6]. The CPE format is used for
platform identification also in other SCAP standards. Below are examples of CPE entries.
cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:6
cpe:/a:microsoft:internet_explorer:8.0.6001:beta
cpe:/a:foo%5cbar:big%24money_manager_2010:::~~special~ipod_touch~80gb~
The CCE format is used for unique identification of software configuration. A CCE
entry is identified by a unique CCE identifier (CCE-#####-#) and contains a description
in the natural language, parameters of the configuration, the technical mechanisms used
for achieving the desired configuration and citations to the standards recommending such
configuration. Below ia an example of an CCE entry 1 :
• CCE ID : “CCE-3416-5”
• CCE Description : “The rhnsd service should be enabled or disabled as appropriate”
• CCE Parameters : “enabled / disabled”
• CCE Technical Mechanisms : “via chkconfig”
• NSA “Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5” : “Section:
2.1.2.2, Value: disabled”.
CVE is an enumeration of known software flaws. A unique CVE identifier containing the
year and number (CVE-YYYY-NNNN) is assigned to a vulnerability in order to identify it
1http://cce.mitre.org/lists/data/downloads/cce-rhel5-5.20111007.xls
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in a unique way. Several CVE numbering authorities (CNA) exist, the primary CNA being
the MITRE Corporation. Other authorities include multiple software vendors as well as
third-party coordinators. A CVE entry consists of a unique identifier, a short description of
the vulnerability and references to public advisories on the vulnerability [15]. CVE entries
published by the MITRE Corporation 2 contain a CVE identifier, a description, a list of
reference links and the date of creation. An entry is presented in the form of a table with
additional fields Phrase, Votes, Comments and Proposed, all marked as legacy. CVE entries
published by the NIST 3 contain different fields, but provide similar information. It seems
that the CVE format is not fully standardized yet, but it is commonly used for referencing
known vulnerabilities by unique identifiers in other SCAP formats.
The CVSS scoring system is used for scoring severity of the vulnerabilities. Several
metrics are used for obtaining the final score used for determining the overall severity of
the vulnerability [10]. The metrics used for calculating the score are divided to several
groups. The Base Metric Group contains metrics like the Access Complexity, impact on
confidentiality, integrity and availability and the access vector – whether local or remote
access is required for exploiting the vulnerability. The Temporal Metric Group contains
metrics about the exploitability (whether an exploit program already exists) or the Reme-
diation Level (whether a fix already exists). The Environmental Metric Group contains
metrics like the Collateral Damage Potential measuring the possible loss of physical assets
and revenue loss or the Target Distribution metric measuring the percentage of systems
that could be affected by the vulnerability. The CVSS score has a form of a text string
containing the identifiers for the metrics and the values for these metrics. Every metric has
a short string identifier as well as a set of possible values represented by the defined letters.
The CCSS scoring system is derived from the CVSS but its primary focus is measuring
severity of software security configuration issues [13]. The CCSS metrics are divided into
several groups. The Base Metric Group containing metrics about exploitability and impact,
the Temporal Metric Group and the Environmental Metric Group. The CCSS Temporal
Metric Group contains the General Exploit Level and the General Remediation Level. The
meaning of the two metrics is the same as in the CVSS standard – they express how often any
vulnerable system is likely to come under attack and the availability of remediation. The
Environmental Metrics are optional and are used for customizing the score for environments
which differs from the environment ideal for the vulnerability. Similarly to the CVSS
system, the CCSS score has a form of a text string representing metrics and their values.
The TMSAD model is focused on the trust model for the XML format containing the
SCAP content. The model defines how to use the public cryptography and hash algorithms
for ensuring integrity, authentication and traceability of SCAP documents [5]. Now let’s
focus on the XCCDF and OVAL formats in more detail since these formats are crucial for
the scap-security-guide project.
3.1 The Extensible Configuration Checklist Description For-
mat
The XCCDF language is defined as an XML schema using the elements <Benchmark>,
<Profile>, <Group>, <Rule>, <Value>, <TestResult> and <Tailoring> [16].
The <Benchmark> element is the root element of XCCDF document. It is a container
2http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-3302
3http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search-results?query=&search_type=all&cves=on
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for the <Profile>, <Group> and <Value> elements. There are several attributes and child
elements with different cardinality defined for the <Benchmark> element. It has to contain
the id attribute and the <version> child element. The id attribute must contain a unique
benchmark identifier in the reverse DNS style, for example “com.company.finance”. It shall
be treated as case insensitive. The advantage of this format is that it assures uniqueness
of identifiers since two authors cannot use the same identifier. The required child element
<version> indicates the version number of the benchmark. There are several optional
attributes, eg. XML schema specification or a Boolean flag indicating the benchmark
resolution status. The <Benchmark> element can optionally contain <Profile>, <Group>
and <Value> child elements, which will be described further in this document. There are
several other optional child elements like title, description, legal notice, reference, platform
specification and signature.
SPECIFICATION FOR THE EXTENSIBLE CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST DESCRIPTION FORMAT (XCCDF) VERSION 1.2 
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6.3 <xccdf:Benchmark> 
6.3.1 Basics 
Each XCCDF benchmark document SHALL consist of a single root <xccdf:Benchmark> element, 
which encloses the entire benchmark. The example below illustrates the outermost structure of an 
XCCDF XML document. 
<?xml version="1.0" ?> 
<xccdf:Benchmark id="xccdf_org.example_benchmark_example1" xml:lang="en"  
Id="toSign" 
      xmlns:htm="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"  
      xmlns:xccdf="http://checklists.nist.gov/xccdf/1.2" 
      xmlns:cpe2-dict="http://cpe.mitr .org/dictionary/2.0"/> 
  <xccdf:status date="2010-06-01">draft</xccdf:status> 
  <xccdf:title>Example Benchmark File</xccdf:title> 
  <xccdf:description> 
     A <htm:b>Small</htm:b> Example 
  </xccdf:description> 
  <xccdf:platform idref="cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:12.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"/> 
  <xccdf:version>0.2</xccdf:version> 
  <xccdf:reference href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc822.txt"> 
      Standard for th  Format of ARPA Internet T xt Messages 
  </xccdf:reference> 
</xccdf:Benchmark> 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical internal structure for a Benchmark.  
Benchmark
Group (d)
Value (b)
Group (e) Rule (h)
Rule (i)
Rule (f) Rule (g)
Profile Profile
Value (a) Value (c)
Group (j) Rule (l)Value (k) Rule (m)
 
Figure 1: Typical Structure of a Benchmark 
The possible inheritance relations between Rule and Value instances are constrained by the tree structure 
of the Benchmark. All extension relationships MUST be resolved before the Benchmark can be applied. 
An item MAY only extend another item of the same type that is visible from its scope. In other words, an 
Figure 3.1: Example of possible XCCDF element hierarchy (taken from [16])
3.1.1 Item elements and the <Rule> element
Several common attributes and child elements exists for the item elements, these are
<Group>, <Rule> and <Value>. There are no required attributes or child elements for
these item elements. Optional attributes are an identifier for referencing elements included
in signature, an attribute changing the visibility of the element, an attribute prohibiting
changes to the item, an abstract attribute and others. Child elements of the item elements
can be status, title, version, description, warning, question to be asked during tailoring
process and element reference. Tailoring refers to checklist customization, such as rule
and value selection, and value redefinition. The XCCDF <Warning> element can have the
category attribute containing one value from the warning category list. There are cate-
gories for warnings about their impact on performance, hardware, functionality, legal and
regulatory implications and others. The <Warning> element should contain the warning
text. The <Group> element contains information about the part of the benchmark and
works as a container for the <Rule>, <Value> as well as for any nested <Group> elements.
It has to contain one unique element identifier attribute and may contain the signature
attribute.
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The XCCDF <Rule> element defines a single item to be checked. Its most important
part is the <check> child element specifying the check to be performed. The <Rule> element
requires the id attribute. There are optional attributes to indicate rule severity, the Boolean
multiple attribute specifies whether multiple instances of the rule target should be tested
separately and the role attribute specifies whether the rule result should have impact on the
overall benchmark score. The rule ident optional attribute’s purpose is to globally indicate
a vulnerability the rule checks, for example by the CVE or CCE identifier. Information on
how to fix the issue the rule is checking can be supplied together with the rule either in
the form of a command in the <fix> child element or in the form of text in the <fixtext>
element. If the rule is used in multiple profiles, a profile specific note can be made in
the optional <Profile-note> child element. Finally, one <complex-check> or multiple
<check> elements can be used as children of the <Rule> element. When multiple <check>
elements are used, they have to differ in their selector or checking system attribute, which
means only one <check> element is applicable to a single rule at the given time. If there is
a need for multiple checks, the <complex-check> element must be used to wrap the checks
with the AND-OR result evaluation scheme. Attributes allowed for the <complex-check>
element are operator with the values AND/OR and the Boolean attribute negate. There
are eight possible results for an XCCDF check and truth tables for AND and OR operations
of those results are specified to help evaluate the outcome.
An example of XCCDF Rule (taken from [16])
<xccdf:Rule id=" xccdf_org.example_rule_pwd -perm" selected ="1" weight ="6.5"
severity ="high">
<xccdf:title >Password File Permission </xccdf:title >
<xccdf:description >Check the access control on the password file.
Normal users should not be able to write to it.
</xccdf:description >
<xccdf:requires idref =" xccdf_org.example_rule_passwd -exists"/>
<xccdf:fixtext >
Set permissions on the passwd file to owner -write , world -read
</xccdf:fixtext >
<xccdf:fix strategy =" restrict" reboot ="0" disruption ="low">
chmod 644 /etc/passwd
</xccdf:fix >
<xccdf:check system ="http :// oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval -definitions -5">
<xccdf:check -content -ref href=" ovaldefs.xml" name="oval:org.example:def
:123"/ >
</xccdf:check >
</xccdf:Rule >
3.1.2 The <check> element
The XCCDF <check> requires that its system attribute points to the URI of the checking
system. Optional attributes are id, negate with the same effect as in the <complex-check>
element, selector and multi-check. The Boolean selector attribute is used in the cases
where multiple checks apply to a single rule, referenced by the <check-content-ref> child
element. All the check results are combined with the AND operation according to its
specification. The selector string attribute is used in the manual tailoring process for
refining the application of the rule.
There are four child elements allowed in the <check> element. The <check-content>
attribute may be used at most once and is supposed to contain the check code in the
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specified checking system language. It may contain an XML language, but its elements
must differ from XCCDF elements. The <check-content> element has lower priority
than the <check-content-ref> element, which means if there are both, <check-content>
and <check-content-ref>, present in a single <check> element, the <check-content>
attribute is not evaluated if the <check-content-ref> evaluation does not fail. The
<check-content-ref> element may be used multiple times and it must contain the href
attribute pointing to the check code location. Optionally, if the name attribute is used,
only a specified part of the check is executed. Otherwise all checks present in the refer-
enced document are executed and their results are combined with the AND operator. If
multiple <check-content-ref> elements are used, the first successful check in the order in
which checks are present in the document is used. The <check-export> element is used
for mapping the <Value> element to the variable of the checking system. Its value-id
attribute must match <Value>’s id attribute value. There is also the <check-import>
child element available for value retrieval from the checking system. When used, it must
be empty and after check execution, the value retrieved from the checking system is stored
in <check-import>, which is a child of the <rule-result> element.
3.1.3 Fix recommendation, the <Value> and <Profile> elements
Various attributes and elements are available for use together with the <fixtext> and <fix>
elements. These attributes are all optional and might express identifiers, flag informing
about a required reboot, estimation of the fix complexity and disruption, and the <sub>
child element is allowed to indicate substitution of a <Value> or <plain-text> element into
fix or fixtext. Both the <fixtext> and <fix> elements support the inheritance specified
by the overrides attribute. The <fixtext> element can contain a reference to the <fix>
element. The <fix> element’s system attribute indicates the fix language by URI. If the fix
command is different for different platforms, a platform can be specified by the platform
attribute of the <fix> element.
An example of XCCDF Value (taken from [16])
<xccdf:Value id=" xccdf_org.example_value_web -server -port" type=" number"
operator =" equals">
<xccdf:title >Web Server Port </xccdf:title >
<xccdf:description >TCP port on which the server listens
</xccdf:description >
<xccdf:value >12080 </ xccdf:value >
<xccdf:default >80</ xccdf:default >
<xccdf:lower -bound >0</xccdf:lower -bound >
<xccdf:upper -bound >65535 </ xccdf:upper -bound >
</xccdf:Value >
The XCCDF <Value> element is designed to carry a named value together with sup-
plementary information like a range or a default value. The simplest usage of the <Value>
element is using it for wrapping a string value. The <Value> element requires the id at-
tribute. It is possible to use the <complex-value> child element, when a list of values has
to be used instead of a single value. A default value and lower and upper limits can be also
set by its child elements. If a value needs to be selected from a list, the <choice> child
element is used. Several <Value> element attributes are supported. It is possible to refer to
a value source by URI, specify the value type or operator used for value comparison with
a real system value by the checking system. The fact a value should be obtained during
the tailoring process can be specified by the interactive attribute and also an attribute
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containing a hint about the value type to be displayed during the tailoring process can be
supplied. Value selectors are used in the tailoring process for selecting values. If there are
multiple values, the selector can be omitted at most at one of them. Such value will be
used as the default value when tailoring was not performed. No selector can be used for
multiple values.
The <Profile> element represents a named result of tailoring, so it specifies which
rules will be selected and which values will be used in the selected rules. The <Profile>
element must have the id attribute and several other attributes may be used. There are
attributes for abstract, note; the extends attribute is used to specify inheritance from
another profile within a benchmark and performing changes may be prohibited by the
prohibitChanges attribute. There is also the optional Id attribute for referencing from
signature, not to be confused with the mandatory id attribute. The following elements
can be used as children of the <Profile> element. The <description> element is used
for the profile description; It can contain HTML formatted text, and the <version> and
<title> string child elements can be used. Status, signature and metadata can be also
supplied in the form of child elements. The most important part of the <Profile> element
is a set of the following selector child elements: The <select> element is used for enabling
rules or groups of rules. It requires the selected Boolean attribute and its idref attribute
must match the existing id value of a rule. For value changing there is the <refine-value>
element. It requires two attributes, the idref attribute to identify a value and the selector
attribute to identify one value to be used. The <remark> child element can be used for
supplying explanatory information. If a new value needs to be specified, the <set-value>
and <set-complex-value> elements can be used for overriding the specified value with
the given simple or complex value. There is also the <refine-rule> element available for
refining rule’s weight, severity and role attributes.
An example of XCCDF Profile (taken from [16])
<xccdf:Profile id=" xccdf_org.example_profile_strict" prohibitChanges ="1"
extends =" xccdf_org.example_profile_lenient" note -tag="strict -tag">
<xccdf:title >Strict Security Settings </xccdf:title >
<xccdf:description >
Strict lockdown rules and values , for hosts deployed to high -risk
environments.
</xccdf:description >
<xccdf:set -value idref =" xccdf_org.example_value_password -len">10
</xccdf:set -value >
<xccdf:refine -value idref =" xccdf_org.example_value_session -timeout"
selector ="quick"/>
<xccdf:refine -rule idref =" xccdf_org.example_value_session -auth -rule"
selector ="harsh"/>
<xccdf:select idref =" xccdf_org.example_value_password -len -rule"
selected ="1"/ >
<xccdf:select idref =" xccdf_org.example_value_audit -cluster"
selected ="1"/ >
<xccdf:select idref =" xccdf_org.example_value_telnet -disabled -rule"
selected ="1"/ >
<xccdf:select idref =" xccdf_org.example_value_telnet -settings -cluster"
selected ="0"/ >
</xccdf:Profile >
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3.1.4 The XCCDF results
The XCCDF format is also used for storing scanning results. This feature of the format
will be described only briefly, since it is not important for this work. There are almost no
benefits of editing test results when compared to editing check specifications. Results are
saved in the <TestResults> element, which can be the child of the <Benchmark> element
or the root element of the document. It can contain information about benchmark, pro-
file, organization, platform, target, scanning time, signature and the scanning score in its
attributes and child elements. Rule results are stored in the <rule-result> elements as
children of TestResults. The <rule-result> elements can also carry various attributes
for severity, weight, time, version or reference to rule. Various child elements can also be
present and contain the encapsulated check, fix, diagnostic message, identifier or metadata.
There can also be the parameter instance describing which instance the result belongs to
if multiple instances of the target were evaluated. Required content of the <rule-result>
element is a string representing the evaluation result. The possible results are as follows:
• pass (P) - Conditions of the check were satisfied.
• fail (F) - Conditions of the check were not satisfied.
• error (E) - Rule evaluation could not be completed because an error occurred.
• unknown (U) - A problem occurred and the result is unknown (for example insuf-
ficient privileges for the check).
• notapplicable (N) - The rule is not applicable to the target.
• notchecked (K) - The rule was not evaluated because of an unsupported checking
system or there were no <check> elements.
• notselected (S) - No rule was selected.
• informational (I) - The rule was checked and the result is only informational.
• fixed (X) - Conditions were not satisfied, but the problem has been fixed.
The AND/OR truth tables (Figure 3.2) are defined in the XCCDF specification for these
eight possible values to determine the result of the logical combination for the <complex-check>
element.
3.2 The Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
The OVAL language is defined as a subset of the XML language [2]. The <oval definitions>
element is used as the document root element. It requires the <generator> child element
which must have the <timestamp> child element indicating the time of creation. Optionally,
there can be the <definitions> element as a child of the <oval definitions> containing
the <definition> child elements. Other optional direct children of the <oval definitions>
element are the <tests>, <objects>, <states>, <variables> and <signatures> elements,
which will be described later in this section.
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Table 12: Truth Table for AND 
AND  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
P  P  F  U  E  P  P  P  P  
F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  
U  U  F  U  U  U  U  U  U  
E  E  F  U  E  E  E  E  E  
N  P  F  U  E  N  N  N  N  
K  P  F  U  E  N  K  K  K  
S  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  S  
I  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
The ³OR´ operator evaluates to Pass if any of its enclosed terms evaluate to Pass. The truth table for 
³25´LVshown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Truth Table for OR 
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If the @negate attribute is set to true, then the result of the <xccdf:complex-check> is 
complemented (inverted). The full truth table for negation is listed in Table 14. 
Table 14: Truth Table for Negation 
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The example below shows an <xccdf:complex-check> with several components. 
SPECIFICATION FOR THE EXTENSIBLE CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST DESCRIPTION FORMAT (XCCDF) VERSION 1.2 
 
 27  
Operators that MAY be used to combine the constituents of an <xccdf:complex-check> are AND 
and OR. Truth tables that MUST be used when evaluating these operators appear in Table 12 (AND) and 
Table 13 (OR). Each <xccdf:complex-check> MAY also specify that the expression should be 
negated (NOT); see Table 14 for the corresponding truth table. All of the abbreviations in the truth tables 
come from the description of the <xccdf:rule-result> element (see Table 26 in Section 6.6.4.2 for 
definitions of each abbreviation). 
:LWKDQ³$1'´RSHUDWRUWKH<xccdf:complex-check> evaluates to Pass only if all of its enclosed 
terms (<xccdf:check> and <xccdf:complex-check> elements) evaluate to Pass. Table 12 
shows tKHWUXWKWDEOHIRU³$1'´ 
Table 12: Truth Table for AND 
AND  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
P  P  F  U  E  P  P  P  P  
F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  
U  U  F  U  U  U  U  U  U  
E  E  F  U  E  E  E  E  E  
N  P  F  U  E  N  N  N  N  
K  P  F  U  E  N  K  K  K  
S  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  S  
I  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
The ³OR´ op rator evaluates to Pass if any of its enclosed terms evaluate to Pass. The truth table for 
³25´LVshown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Truth Table for OR 
OR  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  
F  P  F  U  E  F  F  F  F  
U  P  U  U  U  U  U  U  U  
E  P  E  U  E  E  E  E  E  
N  P  F  U  E  N  N  N  N  
K  P  F  U  E  N  K  K  K  
S  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  S  
I  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
If the @n gat  ttribu e is set to true, en the result of the <xccdf:complex-check> is 
complemented (inverted). The full truth table for negation is listed in Table 14. 
Table 14: Truth Table for Negation 
 
P F U E N K  S  I  
not F P U E N K  S  I  
The example below shows an <xccdf:complex-check> with several components. 
SPECIFICATION FOR THE EXTENSIBLE CONFIGURATION CHECKLIST DESCRIPTION FORMAT (XCCDF) VERSION 1.2 
 
 27  
Operators that MAY be used to combine the constituents of an <xccdf:complex-check> are AND 
and OR. Truth tables that MUST be used when evaluating these operators appear in Table 12 (AND) and 
Table 13 (OR). Each <xccdf:complex-check> MAY also specify that the expression should be 
negated (NOT); see Table 14 for the corresponding truth table. All of the abbreviations in the truth tables 
come from the description of the <xccdf:rule-result> element (see Table 26 in Section 6.6.4.2 for 
definitions of each abbreviation). 
:LWKDQ³$1'´RSHUDWRUWKH<xccdf:complex-check> evaluates to Pass only if all of its enclosed 
terms (<xccdf:check> and <xccdf:com lex-c ck> elements) evaluate to Pass. Table 12 
shows tKHWUXWKWDEOHIRU³$1'´ 
Table 12: Truth Table for AND 
AND  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
P  P  F  U  E  P  P  P  P  
F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  
U  U  F  U  U  U  U  U  U  
E  E  F  U  E  E  E  E  E  
N  P  F  U  E  N  N  N  N  
K  P  F  U  E  N  K  K  K  
S  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  S  
I  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
The ³OR´ operato  evaluates to Pass if any of its enclosed terms evaluate to Pass. The truth table for 
³25´LVshown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Truth Table for OR 
OR  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  
F  P  F  U  E  F  F  F  F  
U  P  U  U  U  U  U  U  U  
E  P  E  U  E  E  E  E  E  
N  P  F  U  E  N  N  N  N  
K  P  F  U  E  N  K  K  K  
S  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  S  
I  P  F  U  E  N  K  S  I  
If the @negate attribute is set to true, then the result of the <xccdf:complex-check> is 
complemented (inverted). The full truth table for negation is listed in Table 14. 
Table 14: Truth Table for Negation 
 
P F U E N K  S  I  
not F P U E N K  S  I  
 
The example below shows an <xccdf:complex-check> with several components. Figure 3.2: The XCCDF result combination tables (taken from [16])
3.2.1 Definitions
The <definition> element requires the id attribute with a globally unique identifier and
the version and class attributes. The <metadata> child element is also required by
the specification. Optionally, there can be the <notes>, <criteria> and <signature>
container child elements.
The <metadata> element requires the <title> and <description> child elements. The
optional <affected> element for indicating affected platforms, the <reference> element
for referencing external information and the <extension point> element for additional
metadata can be used. The <affected> element requires the family string attribute for
classification of the system type. The optional <platform> and <product> child elements
are used to express the platform and product names in the form of a string.
The OVAL <criteria> element is used as a child of the <definition> element and
acts as a container for the <criterion> elements. Optionally, the operator and negate
attributes can be used to specify the <criterion> combination, as well as an attribute
for comment. It is also possible to supply a comment or to use nested <criteria> child
elements. The Boolean <applicability test> flag indicates if this criteria are to be used
for checking whether the definition is applicable for the given system. If necessary, another
definition can be referenced using the <extend definition> element.
The <criterion> element is used for referencing a test. It requires the test ref at-
tribute to contain the reference to the globally unique test identifier. Optionally, the test
negation can be performed, a comment supplied or applicability check indicated. The
<extend definition> element works the same way as the <criterion> element does, the
only difference being that it references another definition instead of a test and the required
attribute is called definition ref.
3.2.2 Tests and objects
The OVAL <tests> element is used as a container for one or more <test> elements.
There are several obligatory attributes for the <test> element. These are the globally
unique identifier id, the test version, comment and the check attribute indicating how
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many of the items must satisfy the requirements to pass (eg. all). Optionally, there can
be the state operator attribute for logical combination of the referenced OVAL states
(default AND) and the deprecated Boolean flag. Optional child elements are <notes> and
<signatures>. As child elements there should be one object element and zero or more
state elements.
The object element is the abstract type for all OVAL objects. Concrete OVAL object
and states are defined in platform specific definition schemas. It requires a unique id,
object version and comment attributes. Optionally, the deprecated Boolean attribute
flag can be used, as well as the <notes> and <signature> child elements. As an example
of a concrete object, we can focus on the <ind:textfilecontent54 object> object from
the Independent definition schema. This object is used for content testing of text files by
regular expressions. The ind: prefix indicates elements from the Independent definition
schema. It requires the <ind:path> and <ind:filename> child elements for locating the
text file in the filesystem. Then the <ind:pattern> child element is used to accommodate
the regular expression to be checked with the operation specified by the attribute, e.g.
“pattern match”. Last required child element of the <ind:textfilecontent54 object> is
the <ind:instance> that indicates the instance of the pattern match to be represented by
the OVAL object, for example value “1” will represent the first regular expression match
in specified file [1]. The <ind:textfilecontent54 object> object can be used in the test
without any state element.
An example of OVAL code for checking owner of the /etc/passwd file
<definition class =" compliance" id="oval:ssg:def :1361" version ="1">
<metadata >
<title >Verify user who owns ’passwd ’ file </title >
<affected family ="unix">
<platform >Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6</platform >
</affected >
<description >The /etc/passwd file should be owned by the
appropriate user.</description >
<reference source ="ssg" ref_id =" file_owner_etc_passwd "/></metadata >
<criteria >
<criterion test_ref ="oval:ssg:tst :1362"/ >
</criteria >
</definition >
<unix:file_test check ="all" check_existence =" all_exist" comment =" Testing
user ownership" id="oval:ssg:tst :1362" version ="1">
<unix:object object_ref ="oval:ssg:obj :2557"/ >
<unix:state state_ref ="oval:ssg:ste :2558"/ >
</unix:file_test >
<unix:file_object comment ="/ etc/passwd" id="oval:ssg:obj :2557" version ="1">
<unix:path >/etc </unix:path >
<unix:filename >passwd </unix:filename >
</unix:file_object >
<unix:file_state id="oval:ssg:ste :2558" version ="1">
<unix:user_id datatype ="int">0</unix:user_id >
</unix:file_state >
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3.2.3 States and variables
The OVAL states work similarly to the OVAL objects. It is also an abstract type with con-
crete specifications in platform definition schemas. It has the same set of required and op-
tional attributes as object elements plus the optional operator attribute to indicate how to
combine the set of entities in the state. For example, there is the <ind:textfilecontent-
54 state> state element which can be also used for checking the text file contents.
The OVAL variables are used for parametrizing OVAL content. Variables also work as
an abstract type with required attributes for id, version, comment and datatype. The
deprecated optional attribute is supported as well as the <notes> and <signature> child
elements with the same functionality as above. The OVAL <external variable> element
is an extension of the variable abstract type and is used for defining variables outside of
an OVAL definition. It may contain the <possible value> elements with the acceptable
value definition or the <possible restriction> container with the <restriction> child
elements to do the same job. The <local variable> element is another extension of the
variable abstract type used for defining a variable defined by another local component of
the OVAL file, such as variable, object or function for string manipulation. Description of
these features of the OVAL language is beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 3.3: An example of how the OVAL Definitions and Variables are used for obtaining
the OVAL Results (taken from [2])
3.2.4 Identifiers and results
One of the difficulties with editing OVAL documents is the required format of OVAL iden-
tifiers. The OVAL language requires definition, test, state and variable identifiers to com-
ply with following format: prefix:namespace:type:id. The prefix is always “oval”, the
namespace can be chosen but needs to be the same for related elements. The type is “def”
for definition, “tst” for test, “obj” for object, “ste” for state and “var” for variable. The
id has to be an integer value, which means that you cannot use a string stating what
the particular object does. The scap-security-guide project solves this problem by using
string identifiers without complying with the above requirements for development and then
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transforms the identifiers to a valid form by invoking the Extensible Stylesheet Language
Transformations (XSLT) transformations from the Makefile.
When evaluating an OVAL document, the system state is transformed to OVAL objects
in process called collection. Errors during state collection may happen. To indicate this
fact the OVAL object can be in one of following states expressed as a flag property.
• error - This value is used when an error prevented collection of the item.
• complete - Indicates a successful collection of object and collected state matches the
specified restrictions.
• incomplete - The collection of object was successful, but the value does not match
the specified restriction. Explanatory message should be present.
• does not exist - The value used when the item was not found in the system.
• not collected - The value used when an attempt to collect an object was not per-
formed. Explanatory message should also be present.
• not applicable - This flag is used when an OVAL object is not applicable to the
system.
The OVAL language specification defines tables for combination of these results based on ex-
istence check evaluation specified by the user. Possible values for the existence check evalua-
tion are all exist, any exist, at least one exists, none exists and only one exists.
The OVAL results are then mapped to the XCCDF results described in the previous chap-
ter.
3.3 The SCAP content projects
Various projects producing SCAP content exists. The scap-security-guide project 4 avail-
able on the fedorahosted.org community website offers security content for Red Hat Enter-
prise Linux 6 and JBoss Enterprise Application Server 5. It is a community project, so it
comes with no guarantee and is not intended as an official checklist for checking compliance
against standards. It is based on the XCCDF and OVAL formats split in several XML files
representing a single category or check. These files are distributed in the directory tree,
which hierarchically represents categories of checks for related information like services,
network or accounts. This data is accessible as a git repository, which contains a Makefile
and several Python scripts used for transformation of these split files to a valid XCCDF and
OVAL documents. This means that the files do not meet all standard requirements, but the
approach partially solves problems with the size of the edited files. There are also multiple
templates available for frequently used patterns like ensuring some service is disabled.
There is another project on the fedorahosted.org producing content for Script Check
Engine. 5 The Script Check Engine (SCE) 6 feature of the openscap tool allows omitting
the use of the OVAL format and allows using the XCCDF language together with a scripting
language like Bash or Python. The check is performed by the script and the result is passed
4https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/
5https://fedorahosted.org/sce-community-content/
6http://open-scap.org/page/SCE/
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to the checking engine in the form of a script exit code. The XCCDF document in the SCE
content project is also split to several parts and later combined using Makefile.
Another SCAP benchmark by Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is called
Security Technical Implementation Guideline (STIG).7 It is designed for Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5 and unlike previous two content projects it is intended as official material, since
DISA belongs to the United States Department of Defense. The STIG documents are
released for various operating systems as a guidance to “lock down” systems. There is also
a checklist from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 5 Desktop called the United States Government Configuration Baseline
(USGCB). 8 It is the official security configuration baseline for federal agencies. Both STIG
and USGCB benchmarks use the XCCDF, OVAL and CPE formats.
7http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/unix/red_hat.HTML
8http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb/rhel_content.HTML
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Chapter 4
Editing the SCAP content
Various approaches and tools for creating and editing SCAP content exists. In this chapter,
their advantages and shortcomings are identified and described.
4.1 Manual content editing
The XCCDF and OVAL formats, as a subset of the XML language, can be edited with
any general purpose text editor. I have tried editing XCCDF and OVAL files with the vim
editor. In a general purpose editor, you can change the XCCDF or OVAL document in any
desired manner, so an invalid XCCDF/OVAL document or even an invalid XML document
can be produced easily. On the other hand, it is possible to create all constructions allowed
by the specification since there are no editor limitations put on the content.
When comparing XCCDF to OVAL manual editing, XCCDF appears to be easier to
edit. It is possible to create a simple one rule document from a minimal skeleton easily.
When trying to edit larger XCCDF document, one can easily get lost in thousands of lines.
Fulltext search to find the desired position in a document seems to be the best option, no
matter if one tries to change or extend the document. This is probably the reason, why in
the scap security guide project the XCCDF document is split into several related groups
in a hierarchically organized directory tree and later combined into a single document by
Python scripts called from Makefile.
Not only is the minimal valid OVAL skeleton larger than the XCCDF minimal skeleton,
OVAL editing is also more complicated because different definition schemas exist. When
manually editing an OVAL document, copying from another OVAL document, used as a
reference, might be the most straightforward way to start. Updating or extending an OVAL
document implies a lot of document search since the OVAL definitions, tests and objects
are located in different parts of the document. Identifier restrictions are more strict when
compared to the XCCDF format.
4.2 The SCAP workbench editor
The SCAP workbench editor is capable of editing the XCCDF only and it is available in the
standard Fedora repository. The editor operates in three “modes”. In Benchmark mode,
you can edit basic benchmark information like id, language, version, descriptions, notices,
references and statuses.
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot of the SCAP workbench editor
In Profile mode, all benchmark profiles are displayed and available for editing. You
can add new benchmarks as well. The user can edit or add groups, rules and values for
every profile by right clicking it. In the right part of the editor window in Profile mode, the
profile id, version, titles, descriptions and statuses can be set. When adding a rule or value
in Profile mode, a searchable list of rules or values is displayed and the user can select an
item from the list.
In Item mode, the left part of the editor window contains a tree of groups of rules and
values. The rules and values can be added by right clicking on a group in the tree, new
item is then created as a child of the selected group. In the right part of the window, the
selected rules and values can be edited. For rules there is an OVAL or script (for the SCE)
reference editable in the Evaluation card.
The SCAP workbench editor is great for performing minor changes in the XCCDF
benchmarks, but its main shortcoming is it cannot be used as the only tool due to its
lack of ability to edit the OVAL documents. For SCE, when a check is scripted in a
general purpose editor, the usage of the SCAP workbench simplifies the XCCDF document
extension by an author without a knowledge of the XCCDF format.
4.3 The eSCAPe editor
The eSCAPe is a multiplatform open-source editor available on the SourceForge website.
It is written in the Java language. The eSCAPe editor offers two modes of operation after
starting - Wizard-Driven and Standard. In Wizard-Driven mode, a document in OVAL
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version from 5.3 to 5.9 with the Unix or Windows file definition schema or the Windows
registry schema can be created. For example, for the Unix file schema, checks for file
permissions or size can be written and then saved in the OVAL format. It is noteworthy
that there is no direct option for creating a check for file content, but it is possible to check
the MD5 or SHA1 hash of a file.
Figure 4.2: The eSCAPe editor in Standard mode
In Standard mode, the XCCDF as well as OVAL documents can be created and edited.
When editing the XCCDF, the benchmark and its groups of rules and values are presented
in the tree form in the left part of the editor window. In the right part, the selected rule or
value can be edited. The right part is divided into tabs. There are the General, References,
Attributes, Values and Source tabs for every value. The Source tab displays the XML
source of the related part of the opened XCCDF document. It is displayed read-only, so it
cannot be edited directly. For rule editing, the General, References, Attributes, Selectable
Item, Role/Severity, Checks and Source tabs are available. The check for the rule can be
set up on the Checks tab, but no list selection like the one in the SCAP workbench editor
is offered: The user has to type the check identifier into a text area.
The eSCAPe editor fails to open the scap-security-guide project RHEL6 OVAL file,
stating “Document type not currently supported“, but it can create the OVAL file from
scratch and then open it. The logic of editing an OVAL document remains the same.
The document is presented on the left side as a tree of Definitions, Tests, Objects and
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Figure 4.3: Wizard of the eSCAPe editor
States. New tree items can be added by right clicking the tree. Purpose of the right part
is providing space for editing the selected tree items. A nice feature is error highlighting,
when the detected syntax errors are highlighted in red. When adding a new test, the test
schema can be selected after platform selection. For the Unix platform, there are various
test schemas available and a schema description is displayed during the selection process.
After the schema selection, the new test must be connected with an object and state. The
process of object and state creation is similar: A new window is displayed and the required
parameters are filled in within several steps.
The eSCAPe editor supports automated XCCDF generation from a given OVAL file. It
is an interesting feature, but probably without many real world use cases. Purpose of the
XCCDF document is to contain explanatory information about a check which is missing in
the generated file.
4.4 The Benchmark Editor
The Benchmark Editor is also a Java based open-source editor. It has a layout similar to the
previous two editors: The benchmark elements are presented in the form of a tree on the left
side. Rules and values can be edited on the right side after selected by double-clicking the
tree. In the bottom part of the window, there are two boxes displaying elements referring
to the element currently being edited and elements referenced by the edited element.
Editing can be performed in two modes. In Low Level Editor mode, it is possible to
directly edit the XML elements of the XCCDF or OVAL file. High Level Editor mode is
available only for the XCCDF format. In High Level Editor mode, multiple rules and values
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Figure 4.4: Benchmark editor
can be opened and edited in the presented text areas. New attributes or child elements
can be added by right clicking in the editor and selecting one of the “Add before”, “Add
children” or “Add after” options. This is also how references can be created: At least new
values can be added this way to the existing rules. However adding a value to a newly
created rule is not offered by the editor.
The Benchmark Editor is consuming a lot of CPU when working with larger files.
Opening multiple items at a time and quick navigation to referred items is a good idea, but
unfortunately it is hard to use the tool for extending an XCCDF document with new rules.
Direct manual editing of the OVAL format is supported without any syntax highlighting or
other helper features, so there are no benefits from using the Benchmark Editor for editing
OVAL.
4.5 Other related tools
The Recommendation Tracker 1 is designed for viewing and editing SCAP content. It is
supposed to work as a client for a MySQL database containing content data, but standalone
mode can be enabled by an admin user. It is possible to import an XCCDF document from
1http://sourceforge.net/projects/rectracker/
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a file, but only XCCDF version 1.2 is supported. The XCCDF rules can be edited in the
new window displayed after you select a rule in the main window. The rule descriptive
information as well as checks and references can be added and edited in several tabs. The
OVAL check identifier has to be typed into a text area; no selection from a list or OVAL
editation is possible. New rules can be added in the main window.
I have also experimented with a back-end database containing the supplied example
data, but either the database synchronization process failed or there was an error displayed
when tried to select an “application”. It seems the term “application” is used for a profile
for a single application describing the application users and their permissions in the form
of SCAP standards. I got this impression from its menu options and fields available in
the “New application” dialogue window, although due to tool bugs I have not seen what I
consider the main tool functionality - database stored content browsing.
Another tool that is of interest is called the OVAL Interpreter 2. According to the
tool description on the SourceForge website, its aim is demonstration of usability of the
OVAL format and ensuring correctness of syntax, but it is not intended as a fully functional
scanner. Unfortunately, I was not able to compile the tool, not even after several trivial
patching attempts because of errors in the xalan-c XSLT processor reported by the gcc
compiler.
2http://sourceforge.net/projects/ovaldi/
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Chapter 5
The SCAP Editor design
In this chapter, a new editor design is proposed: First the analysis of requirements is
presented; use cases, for which the new editor is intended are described; and new approaches
different from those used in the currently available tools are proposed.
5.1 Requirement analysis
This project is carried out in cooperation with the Red Hat company. The requirements
from Red Hat include designing a new tool or implementing improvements to the existing
tool in order to simplify the SCAP content creation in the scap-security-guide 1 project.
The SSG project uses the XCCDF and OVAL formats and the collaboration is performed
using a git repository and a mailing list. The new tool has to be capable of editing existing
SCAP content used in the SSG project and allow the project contributors to create new
content.
Users of the requested tool will be the contributors to the SSG project, which are people
with a strong technical background. The tool should minimize the effort required for SCAP
content editing for people with at least a brief knowledge of the specifications of the SCAP
standards. There are no special requirements for technologies used, but a web application
accessible via a web browser is preferred. The tool should use only open-source technologies
and is expected to be released as a free software. The most important part of the tool will
be responsible for editing the XCCDF format, since this is the key part for the SSG project.
5.2 Use cases
To meet the requirements, a new web-based editor for the XCCDF and OVAL formats needs
to be created. It should reduce the amount of effort required for content editing and should
foster content creation in the scap-security-guide project. A web-based editor would save
the user’s time as no tool download, unpacking, or possibly compilation would be needed.
When one wishes to extend the existing community content, obtaining the current version
of the content is one of the key parts of the process. Cloning a git repository to the user’s
computer can be avoided by the editor by keeping the current version of the community
content at the server side and offering the user an option to simply open the current source.
When editing is finished, the changes made are usually sent for review to the community
mailing list in the form of a patch or committed to a repository if the user has the commit
1https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/
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rights. Creating a patch from the introduced changes can be also performed by the editor.
The patch created by the editor then can be saved to the user’s computer and mailed
to the review mailing list by the user manually. The new editor could have this feature
implemented and send the patch directly, but this could lead to community mailing list
spamming.
Uploading an XCCDF or OVAL file, editing it and then downloading a modified version
should also be supported. Validation of an open file should be possible; pointing the user
to the problematic spot and letting him fix the problem. One does not usually create a
benchmark from scratch for other then testing purposes. Main use cases of the editor will be
extension or modification of existing benchmarks. If an instance of the editor is intended for
creating content for a single product, it might be useful to have an instance of the product
and allow performing scans on it. However, this feature would involve possible security
risk, since the check has to be performed by the root user and may consume a significant
amount of resources. Because of this advantages/shortcoming ratio I am not intending to
implement this feature in the editor, but this idea might be implemented as an extension
later.
User
Add Rule
Modify Rule
Open File
Upload File
Add Test
Modify Test
Download File
Format Patch
Git Pull
Validate Current State
<<include>>
<<include>>
<<include>>
<<include>>
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
Figure 5.1: Use case diagram
5.3 Simplifying content editing
I believe XML formatting is not the main problem of the SCAP content editing. Authors
of security content need at least some computer science background, so I do not consider
simple XML knowledge being the problem. When manually editing an XML file, one
needs to check the specification or another existing file as a reference fairly often. The
editor should allow the user to edit the XML format directly, but supply information about
attributes and child elements allowed at the current cursor position, a feature similar to
the integrated development environment code auto-completion (IntelliSense). This should
be done based on an XML schema definition file instead of being hardcoded in the editor
so the support for new OVAL schemas can be added easily.
A short description should be available for attributes and child elements available at the
current cursor position. This will not be as straightforward to implement since there is no
element (attribute) description mapping other than the language specifications. Hardcoding
a description directly into an editor is not a clean solution, but this problem might be
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solved by a configuration files with the element and attribute descriptions. These files need
to be created manually from the standard specifications, but it will require less effort than
editor patching, when the time for implementing changes to the descriptions comes. I was
considering using links directly to the PDF specification for the descriptions, but I believe
a short element description will be more useful, although a direct link to the specification
is quite easy to implement and might be appreciated by users.
One of the difficulties the OVAL content creator has to solve is the strictness of the
OVAL identifier requirements. Another issue arises from the fact, that related strips of
content are distributed in multiple locations in the OVAL document, connected by its
identifiers. The editor can help the user by displaying only the related and ignoring the
unrelated content or by displaying the related strips of the file together. Not displaying
identifiers to the user at all was also considered, but it may cause problems for the use
cases, where the specified test needs to be replaced by another test which already exists.
5.4 Object oriented design
The iterative development model was chosen for this project since this project was consid-
ered too complex to be designed in one iteration, so initial design is expected to change
later on, when problems and requirements yet not known are discovered. Several other
classes are expected to be added; the currently presented classes might be split or joined.
The first iteration design contains the following classes:
• Editor - The main class responsible for displaying the edited text in the main part
of the editor window.
• InputOutput - The class responsible for file upload/download and communication
with git. It supports file upload for editing, downloading edited file, loading file from
git to the editor and patches formatting.
• XCCDFParser - The parser class for the XCCDF format used for putting related
parts of the document together by Editor and for getting a list of the currently
available elements by Helper.
• OVALParser - Same as XCCDFParser, but adapted for the OVAL format.
• Helper - The Helper class helps the user by listing the elements and attributes allowed
at the given cursor position. The class also maintains a short description pop-ups for
the allowed elements.
• ModeSelector - This class is used for selecting the editor “mode“. The user can
decide to either edit the current rule for the XCCDF format or add a new rule. Similar
functionality for the OVAL format.
5.5 Editor workflow
On the start screen, the user can select a locally stored file and upload it to the editor.
Another possibility is to select an XCCDF or OVAL file from the scap-security-guide project
git repository. The uploaded files are not saved in the server filesystem unless requested by
the user. If a file from git is selected, it is checked for a newer version before the editor is
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Figure 5.2: Class diagram
opened. Since git pull is relatively time expensive, it is not performed with every opening
of a file from git, but only if it was not performed within the last minute.
On the main editor screen, there is a text area element used for editing and several
options are available on button click. The user is able to download the current version of
the edited document, validate it with OpenSCAP and if a file from git was edited, it is
possible to acquire the differences from the git version of the file in the form of a patch.
If the autosave option is checked by the user, the editor uploads the current version of the
edited document to the server every minute. When the OpenSCAP validation is requested,
the document is also temporarily saved in the server filesystem. Since the XCCDF and
OVAL documents are usually quite long and related parts are spread across the document,
it is possible to select a single rule/test for editing and any irrelevant content is hidden
from the text area. This hiding feature can be enabled or disabled as necessary, even for
different rule/test without actually changing the document. The close button is used for
returning to the start screen: Any changes are lost permanently on closing.
The editor helps the users with the autocompletion feature, which reduces the amount
of required consulting with the format specifications without losing the ability of full docu-
ment content control. For every element there is an internally available list of the allowed
attributes and child elements. The autocompletion feature helps the user with the docu-
ment structure construction by displaying the autocompletion pop-up box every time when
an attribute name or a new element can be supplied and contains a list of attributes/ele-
ments allowed at the current cursor position. There is also a short pop-up description for
every element in the autocompletion box that is displayed on mouse hover.
When editing an XCCDF file from git with a referenced OVAL file available, the editor
suggests test reference IDs with a short description. When the user selects the OpenSCAP
validation of the current document state, it is uploaded to the server, validated and the
validation result is presented to the user. The user is allowed to continue editing the doc-
ument, including correcting of the errors discovered by the validation. Syntax highlighting
in editor’s text area is also supported.
Since the editor is to be web-based, problems like losing the Internet connection while
editing need to be considered. If the connection is lost or there is a bug in the server
code, the user can still after a failed download attempt click the browser back button and
copy the editor text area content manually to a file and save it until the problem with
connection is fixed. Failures which cannot be handled this way may also occur, for example
user’s browser or operating system crash. This can be partially solved by storing the file
being edited on the server on user request. This requires using sessions for accessing the
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Figure 5.3: The editor workflow diagram
stored documents and brings a risk of wasting server diskspace if large amount of files are
being stored at a time, even if only one saved file per session is allowed. The autosave and
the OpenSCAP validation features require the document to be stored temporarily on the
server filesystem. The editor also uses the unencrypted HTTP protocol, so the document
is being transferred over the network in a plaintext form. This does not limit only to the
autosave and validation features, but all the use cases.
5.6 Technologies
For the server site, the Python language was chosen from the set of common languages
for web-based application development based on author’s preference and experience. The
Python language is a high-level and easy-to-write scripting language supporting object
oriented approach. In addition, various frameworks for web development exist in Python
Figure 5.4: The start screen
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Figure 5.5: The main editor window, autocompletion example
[11]. Because the SCAP editor is rather small and it is not a typical web application
the Flask microframework was chosen. A database backend is not required for this editor
and the main computations will be made by objects outside the framework. The Flask
framework will handle the communication with clients over the HTTP protocol and help
with displaying information to the user in the form of HTML pages by templating. The
Flask framework uses the Jinja2 template engine for templating [12]. Templating is the
easy way to embed Python variable values to defined spots in HTML templates.
The first iteration design is planned to have all code on the server side and use the
client only for displaying purposes. This approach was revised since code suggestion has to
be performed on the client side. For the state-of-the-art browser client-side programming,
the JavaScript language is used almost exclusively. Various opensource projects for code
syntax highlighting exist [17], but only the CodeMirror project has a working example of
XML autocompletion 2. The autocompletion example is a working proof of concept which
has predefined attributes for autocompletion hardcoded, but with templating it is not a
problem to configure these values. The CodeMirror project comes with the MIT license, so
there are no license restrictions like in the GPL licensed code. The autocompletion example
only lacks the help feature which has to be implemented on top of the CodeMirror library.
Using the CodeMirror library also solves syntax highlighting.
2http://codemirror.net/demo/xmlcomplete.html
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Figure 5.6: Fragment of the main window, selection of a single rule to be displayed
Figure 5.7: OpenSCAP validation output
The XSD (XML Schema Definition) format specifications exist for the XCCDF format3
as well as for the OVAL language, including its extensions4. The XSD format definitions
will be parsed on the server side by the parser classes and passed to the client by templating.
For every element, two lists will be necessary. The list of allowed attributes and the list
of allowed child elements. Since there is a set of possible elements and attributes for both
formats, two associative arrays for each format are used. The key will be the element
name and value will be the list of attributes or elements. Since the interpreting language
is JavaScript, the JSON format was chosen for encoding these associative arrays.
The help feature of autocompletion can be easily implemented using the jQuery JavaScript
framework, licensed under the MIT license. The jQuery framework contains a tooltip plu-
gin, which can be used for displaying the title attribute of a tag [19]. The CodeMirror
hint add-on uses <li> tags for pop-up box items, so the title attribute can be associated
with them and the tooltip displayed by one-line jQuery code.
3http://scap.nist.gov/schema/xccdf/1.2/xccdf_1.2.xsd
4http://oval.mitre.org/language/version5.10.1/
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Chapter 6
Implementation
The implemented solution does not exactly match the solution designed in the previous
chapter. In this chapter, the changes to the design made during the development process
are described together with the implemented object-oriented design. Several problems arose
during the development phase; solutions to this problems along with notes on testing are
discussed below as well.
6.1 Changes to the designed solution
Because the iterative development model was chosen for this project, the design and the
implementation phases were not strictly divided but were happening in parallel. This is
the reason why the solution implemented at the time this text is being written differs from
the solution designed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the order of the requirement
priority has changed slightly with the time running out.
In the previous chapter, the general purpose XCCDF and OVAL editor design was
proposed with respect to usability of the editor in the scap-security-guide project. Later,
during the development process, the usability in the scap-security-guide project became
the top requirement. This change resulted a change of how the editor deals with large
XCCDF and OVAL files. The original solution based on the editor feature of selecting
rules to be displayed was not implemented; instead the solution currently being used in
the scap-security-guide git was used. This change was needed because if the final post-
transformation valid files would be edited, the patches created could not be applied against
the pre-transformation files used in the scap-security-guide project.
The scap-security-guide project uses its own format called the Shorthand XCCDF. It is
the standard XCCDF format with several minor changes. Since it is used for files intended
to be later combined, it does not require a single root element, so a Shorthand XCCDF
file is technically not even a valid XML file. The <Group>, <Rule> and <Value> tags
are typically used on the top level. Another difference is in the way the OVAL check
is referenced. The <oval> tag is used for referencing a check in the Shorthand XCCDF
format. The difference between the <oval> and the <check-content-ref> tag according
to the XCCDF specification is that the <oval> tag uses non-valid string reference to the
OVAL check instead of the strict format required by the OVAL specification. The scap-
security-guide project uses string identifiers for the OVAL checks during development and
later are these identifiers transformed into other identifiers complying with the specification
requirements.
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When a file from the scap-security-guide project git is opened, the editor has to be
prepared for the non-valid XCCDF and OVAL documents. For the XCCDF, it means
suggested hints must be different as well as the validation process has to include contents
building specified in Makefile. Since no authoritative specification of the Shorthand XCCDF
format exists, the autocompletion hints for the Shorthand XCCDF format are based on a
configuration file created by the current scap-security-guide XCCDF files inspection.
The single rule display feature was not implemented and the scap-security-guide direc-
tory tree was used instead. The editor is still capable of editing uploaded user custom
XCCDF and OVAL files, but the single rule display feature is not available in this case.
Another helper feature for the Shorthand XCCDF format was implemented. There are the
“Add Rule” and “Add Group” buttons placed on the right side below the main editor text
area. These buttons are used for minimal Rule/Group template creation. After clicking
one of these buttons, the user is prompted to provide the name of the new Rule/Group and
after supplying the name, the new Rule/Group is created at the current cursor position.
The option of downloading the current document state was removed from the cases when a
scap-security-guide git file is edited since there are almost no use cases for using it and the
current document contents can be obtained using the clipboard. In figure 6.1 an example
of the implemented editor used for editing Shorthand XCCDF files from the scap-security-
guide git is depicted. It shows all control buttons visible as well as the autocompletion
feature together with the help pop-up example for the <Group> tag child elements available
in the Shorthand XCCDF format.
Figure 6.1: The main editor window, autocompletion example for the Shorthand XCCDF
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Full support for the Shorthand XCCDF format was implemented. However, there was
not enough time left for the full OVAL support and Apache integration. Based on my
consultant’s advice, the OVAL support was prioritized. The editor as a web service is
planned for a future release, but at the time of creation of this text the editor is being
distributed in the form of a Python application being run locally on the client. This
decision solved many problems at once. Not only the Apache integration, but also the
multi-user support, git repository concurrent modification as well as the Selinux context
creation would necessarily be performed in order to ship the editor to users in the form of
a web service. None of this tasks has to be solved in order to ship the editor to users in
the form of an RPM package. The editor application was packaged as an RPM package
available for download on the fedorahosted.org community website. After starting the editor
application, it is waiting for the HTTP requests on non-standard port 4444.
The local scap-security-guide git repository clone was placed into the user’s home direc-
tory. The local copy of the repository is necessary since the git clone operation is extremely
expensive in comparison with the git pull operation. Temporary changes are made to files
in the local git repository only when the “Get patch” or the “Validate” buttons are clicked,
but when the repository is located on the web server, problems with multiple users trying
to change the same file concurrently must be solved. Another benefit of this workaround is
that no Selinux context has to be created. The Selinux has a relatively strict requirements
on files a web application can access, so changes to the default context would probably be
required if a web application has to access a git repository. Since currently the editor is
not running as a web application under the Apache web server but as a standalone Python
application, there are no problems with the Selinux as a process created by the user reads
and modifies files under the user’s home directory.
The OVAL support was implemented so a new check for the scap-security-guide project
could be created using the implemented tool. With respect to this fact, the Oval-Definitions,
Oval-Common, Independent, Unix and Linux OVAL schema support was implemented.
Additional schema support can be trivially added, but only the above schemas are used,
since the primary purpose of the editor is being used during development in the SSG
project and suggesting hints on irrelevant definition schemas brings no benefit to users.
The autocompletion feature based on the above listed definition schemas works for user
custom OVAL files as well, but there is a limitation on namespace prefixes, which has to
match the conventions used in the SSG project.
Figure 6.2: The start screen
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Figure 6.2 shows the editor start screen. In the top part, an XCCDF file can be chosen
for editing or deletion. The deletion option creates a patch deleting the selected file. The
“Create new” button is used for opening the new dialogue where you can choose a new
file destination directory from the directories already present in the SSG git directory tree
and the file name. Then the editor with the new file minimal template is opened. The
middle section is dedicated to the OVAL format and works exactly the same way as the
top section. The bottom part is used for uploading custom XCCDF and OVAL files to the
editor. The format of uploaded file is distinguished automatically.
Figure 6.3: The new file dialogue
Since the primary focus of the implemented editor was the scap-security-guide project
and a name for the editor needed to be chosen in order to publish it, the editor was named
scap-security-guide-editor (SSGE).
6.2 Implemented classes
Since various unexpected problems had to be solved during implementation, the imple-
mented class design differs from the design proposed in the previous chapter. The current
object-oriented model is briefly described in this section.
The main application object implements an instance of the Flask application class.
This object is handling the requests coming from clients over the HTTP protocol. The
main file also contains functions implementing the sub-pages. Such functions are decorated
with the route decorator. The modeSelector function implements the start page shown
in figure 6.2 using the HTML template file with the same name. The editor function
implements the main editor page 6.1 also using a template. The newxccdf and newoval
pages are implemented by functions with the corresponding names calling the newfile
function returning the newfile HTML template, which is then used for selection of the
new file directory and name. The Jinja2 templating engine is used also for creating the
minimal XCCDF/OVAL content for the newly created file by supplying identifiers based
on the new file name. In the main Python file are also functions for file deletion, current
state validation and download. These functions do not return any rendered pages; they are
not using any HTML templates.
The SSGGit class based on the InputOutput class designed in the previous chapter
handles the tasks related to the git repository. When a git repository is not found in the
.scap-security-guide-dig directory under the user’s home directory, the SSG project
git is cloned to this directory by the clone method of the SSGGit object. This typically
happens when the editor is run for the first time. The pull method performs the git pull
operation when a file is opened. The make method builds valid output contents by invok-
ing Makefile in the specified path. The content for various products (RHEL6, RHEVM3,
OpenStack, JBossEAP5) exist in the SSG git repository. The make operation is performed
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after changes were made and the output content is built and available for validation. It’s
not necessary to build unchanged content for other products, which will not be used for
validation. Another task performed by the SSGGit class is creation of lists of the git files
available for opening. The Shorthand XCCDF and OVAL files are found in the repository
and list of the XCCDF and OVAL files for every product is created. The list of the available
OVAL identifiers is also constructed using an instance of the OvalIds class. The SSGGit
class is also used for performing temporary changes on files in the repository and obtaining
patches. The modify method changes the contents of a specified file to the given text and
the undo method reverts performed changes to the git HEAD. If a new file was created by
the modify method, the guide.xslt file has to be modified in order to add the contents
of the newly created file to the output files during the content build process invoked by
the make method. The newly created file is later removed by the delete method. The
fileContent method reads contents of the given file and returns them in the form of a
string. This method is also used for several tasks requiring file reading outside of the SSGGit
class. The diff method serves for obtaining the patch by invoking the git diff command
after modifying the specified file and then reverting the changes using the undo method.
The OvalIds class is used for locating the OVAL definition identifiers in the OVAL
files. It is used only on files from the SSG git repository through the SSGGit class. Only a
single check per file is used in the scap-security-guide project, so the first check definition
found is returned. The OVAL identifiers with brief check descriptions are used when editing
the XCCDF files from the SSG git as hints for the id attribute of the <oval> Shorthand
XCCDF element.
The XsdParser class is used for parsing the XSD schema files of the XCCDF and
OVAL formats to obtain data for the suggestion hints. Originally the XCCDF 1.2 and
OVAL 5.10.1 XSD files were part of the editor package. After discovering these files are
shipped together with the OpenSCAP tool, the editor was modified to use the specifications
contained in the OpenSCAP RPM package. The hints for child elements are obtained
by the parseChildren method. The parseChildren method searches for the <element>
tags. If the <element> tag found contains the name attribute, its value is used as a hint.
Similarly, if the <element> tag found contains the <annotation> child element containing
the <documentation> child element, the contents of this <documentation> element are
used as the help text for this hint. The <element> tags without the name attribute can also
be found in the XSD documents. These elements contain the ref attribute instead. The
<element> tag with the ref attribute is used when additional restrictions, for example for
the identifier format, need to be supplied. Fortunately, these referenced types are defined in
the XSD document as well. This mapping of type to name is obtained from the <element>
tags containing both the name and type attributes. When such an element is found, the
name is associated with the type and all the elements containing this type attribute are
considered to contain the corresponding name attribute.
Since the definition of allowed child elements has a form of a tree, the allowed child
elements parsing works in the following way. When the <element> tag is found, the
parseChildren method does not search for its possible child elements, but instead it
searches for its parent elements. If the parent <element> tag is found, the element cur-
rently being processed is added to the parent element’s list of allowed children. If no parent
<element> tag is found, the currently being processed element is considered allowed as the
document top-level (root) element.
The lists of allowed attributes for elements are obtained from the XSD files in a similar
way by the parseAttributes method of the XsdParser class. The parseAttributes
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method searches for the <attribute> elements which are children of the <element> tags
or the <complexType> elements. Similarly, when the <attribute> element is found, its
name attribute is taken as a hint and if its child element <annotation> containing the
<documentation> element is present, the contents of the <documentation> element are
taken as the hint text.
When no parent (indirect) of the <attribute> element is found and the <complexType>
element is used instead, the name of the element to which the currently processed attribute
belongs is taken from the mapping of type to name. This mapping was constructed when
the allowed child element list was parsed.
The XsdParser class is used directly for parsing the single XCCDF 1.2 XSD file. Since
various definition schemas for the OVAL format exist and every schema has its own XSD
specification file, the hint parsing has to be handled in a different way. The OvalParser
class was implemented to solve this problem. The parsing of the allowed child elements and
attributes for a single OVAL XSD file works the same way as for the XCCDF XSD file, so
for this parsing the XsdParser class can be used directly. The different OVAL definition
schemas have to use different XML namespace prefixes. The OvalParser uses objects of the
XsdParser class for parsing the child elements and attributes for every definition schema
and then combines obtained results adding the corresponding namespace prefixes.
The FormatRecognizer class is used for determining the format of custom files uploaded
by users. The recognition is performed by inspection of the file namespaces. If the “oval”
substring is found in any of the namespaces and the “xccdf” substring is not found in any
of the namespaces, the file is considered to be in the OVAL format. Otherwise, the file is
considered to be in the XCCDF format. The Validator class is used for content validation
by invoking the openscap command. After the validation of the XCCDF or OVAL content
is performed by the OpenSCAP tool, the result of the verification is presented to the user.
Figure 6.4: Diagram of the implemented classes
6.3 The JavaScript part and the SSG content building
The scap-security-guide-editor also relies on three JavaScript scripts located in the edi-
tor.html template. JavaScript scripts are usually placed to a separate file, but an exception
was made in order to use the advantages of the templating feature of the Flask framework.
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Templating is used for passing the hints obtained by the XsdParser and OvalParser classes
to the CodeMirror JavaScript instance in the JSON format. The purpose of the most
important of the scripts is to create and set up an instance of the CodeMirror object. The
CodeMirror object is responsible for the syntax highlighting and code suggestion. Patched
CodeMirror library version 3.1 is shipped as part of SSGE. Several minor issues in the code
suggestion demo were fixed by the patches and support for supplying help accessible in the
form of pop-ups for the hints was added. Another JavaScript script contains the validate
function which is used for sending the current editor contents to the server using the AJAX
POST method and display to the user the result of validation. The third script defines
the functions addRule and addGroup accessible by the “Add Rule” and “Add Group”
buttons, which are used for adding the minimal Rule/Group template to the current cursor
position. The user is prompted for a new Rule/Group name which is supplied to the
minimal templates by the JavaScript string substitution.
SSGE was developed and tested on the RHEL6 operating system. However, when using
the Fedora 18 operating system, two problems with building the scap-security-guide content
were found. One problem happening on the up-to-date Fedora 18 operating system caused
the building of the git contents to fail with the “xsl:attribute: The attribute name ’xmlns’
is not allowed.” error. This problem should be known to scap-security-guide project devel-
opers and according to a mailing-list thread 1 it is specific to the libxslt package version.
The problem occurs because the string “xmlns” is used as a value of the name attribute
of the xsl:template element in the scap-security-guide project, which is is not allowed by
the XSLT specification. Older versions of the libxslt package (libxslt-1.1.26-2.el6 3,
libxslt-1.1.26-9.fc17) contain the bug which allows users to use the “xmlns” as a
name of the xsl:template element. The bug is fixed in newer versions of the libxslt pack-
age (libxslt-1.1.27-2.fc18, libxslt-1.1.28-1.fc17). Since the Fedora 18 operating
system contained the libxslt-1.1.27-2.fc18 at the time of creation of this paper and
fortunately no important system components are dependent on the libxslt package, users of
SSGE were advised to temporarily downgrade their libxslt package to version 1.1.26 until
this problem is fixed in the scap-security-guide project.
Another problem with building of the scap-security-guide project content on the Fedora
18 operating system appeared after fixing the previous issue. When the main Makefile is
invoked, the following error is returned “ /home/user/scap-security-guide/rpmbuild/rpm-
tmp.IlgSr4: line 49: makewhatis: command not found”. There is no such problem on
the RHEL6 operating system. The makewhatis command is provided by the man pack-
age which was replaced by the man-db package, which does not provide the makewhatis
command. The makewhatis command is invoked when packaging the scap-security-guide
project contents for all products into the RPM package. Fortunately, the SSGE does not
have to perform this operation and this problem does not happen when a product-specific
Makefile is invoked. Furthermore, only files for a single product are changed at a time so
building valid output content for all products on the current state validation was a waste
of resources.
6.4 Testing
The implemented solution was packaged and released in the form of an RPM package,
SRPM package and Bzip2 archive as the scap-security-guide-editor 1.0 on the fedora-
1http://www.mail-archive.com/scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org/msg02140.html
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hosted.org community website 2. During implementation phase, I periodically performed
functional testing. After releasing SSGE 1.0, deeper testing was performed by two Red Hat
engineers. The feedback and results of this testing are provided in the list below.
1. Is SSGE a bundle or an application with libraries? If it is a bundle, it does not comply
with Fedora packaging guidelines.
2. The copyright note is missing in some files.
3. Why is it a web application and what is the additional value when compared to an
Emacs plug-in?
4. It is not possible to introduce changes to multiple files and then obtain a single patch
because changes are lost with pressing the Close button. The same problem applies
to creating multiple files.
5. The Get patch button should not be visible when no changes have been made.
6. Why is there no preview of the changes made?
7. Orientation in the directory tree is not intuitive.
8. The important feature of the Undo and Redo operations is accessible only using
keyboard shortcuts, which is not documented.
9. The Add Rule function is not intelligent and creates the new rule wherever the cursor
is which might result in non-valid XML content. This function should at least jump
to the end of the current tag if the cursor is inside a tag.
10. How are conflicts resolved?
11. The editor responds with Internal Service Error when a file is uploaded.
12. Why isn’t the editor fullscreen? Why is there empty space around? (Zoom in the
browser is a good workaround.)
13. Autocompletion hints for a tag are always the same; it’s possible to create multiple
id attributes in a tag, which makes no sense.
14. The git format-patch should be used instead of git diff for creation of the patch.
Additional information about the author or date could be supplied this way. It would
be also nice to have a mailto link which would be used for submitting the patch to
the community mailing list for review.
6.4.1 A discussion on the testing feedback
The feedback from testing contains a lot of questions which I attempt to answer in this
subsection. I will provide also additional comments on other points mentioned in the notes
testing.
2https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide-editor/
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1. Yes, there are the CodeMirror and jQuery JavaScript libraries shipped as part of
SSGE. I am not aware of any other web application being shipped in the form of an
RPM package and using JavaScript libraries so I was not able to check it for reference.
But I doubt a JavaScript library would be accepted as a Fedora package.
2. There is the LICENSE file shipped together with SSGE 1.0. Copyright notice was
added to all Python files. This fix is available in the project git repository and will
be included in the next release.
3. The editor has the form of a web application because it is planned to be provided
as a web service is planned. When compared to an Emacs plugin, the advantage is
that no additional skills are required for using the editor. Some users may prefer
Vim or another editor to Emacs and the implemented solution in the form of a web
application does not force them to learn Emacs.
4. This is one of the biggest limitations of the editor. Such a feature was neither orig-
inally required, designed nor implemented. Actually this is a feature request but a
reasonable and therefore has been added to the planned features for a future release.
5. This is a reasonable feature request and has been added to the planned features as
well. There is no use case for using the Get patch button when no changes were made.
6. This feature was not requested either, but can be implemented in the future. Basically
it is a Get patch operation with the result being presented to the user instead of being
offered for download.
7. This is a subjective finding, but I tend to agree. Currently, the file list is presented in
reversed alphabetical order, alphabetical order would make more sense. Multi-level
tree selection would be probably more intuitive, but I’m not sure whether it is worth
implementing it. This is a low priority feature request.
8. This feature was not originally requested and designed, which is the reason why it is
not documented. The fact it is accessible by keyboard shortcuts is accidental. This
is probably a feature of the browser or the CodeMirror library. The issue has been
classified as a feature request; research on the possibility of adding the Undo and
Redo buttons is needed.
9. This is another reasonable feature request. The current absence of this check has no
real-world usecase. Note: The user can fully control the edited document contents,
so it is not possible to prevent the user from creating invalid constructions.
10. Any changes made to the local repository are instantly reverted, so no conflicts can
happen while using the editor. Conflicts may occur only if the local repository is
manually modified or the editor crashes or is killed between a modification and a
reversion. No mechanisms for resolving conflicts were implemented, so manual conflict
resolution is necessary in this case. The current approach of keeping a local clone of the
git repository is a temporary workaround until the Apache integration is implemented,
so a different way of dealing with the repository is planned. Based on this fact, this
feature is not planned for implementation.
11. This was actually a bug. A fix is available in the git repository and will be included
in the next release.
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12. There were no requirements for the editor size, so a fix size was chosen. However, the
size can be calculated from the window size by a JavaScript code and set to the main
editor text area. The solution is planned for a future release.
13. The current implementation of the CodeMirror library has no mechanisms for dealing
with this issue. Such a feature could be implemented; however, the user’s responsi-
bility for creating sane content constructions cannot be substituted with any editor
functionality. This feature is relatively hard to implement with the current CodeMir-
ror library and the benefits of having this feature are relatively small when compared
to the effort required to implement it. Classified as low priority feature request.
14. This is a good idea: This proposal has been added as a set of feature requests planned
for the next release.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis is focused on design and implementation of an improved editor for the SCAP
security standard content. In the first chapter, an introduction to the computer security was
provided and the need for standardization explained. The XCCDF and OVAL formats were
briefly introduced in the context of the SCAP protocol family in the second chapter along
with several projects producing SCAP content. The state-of-the-art editors and content
editing approaches were described in the second chapter and their benefits and shortcoming
were identified. Manual content editing in general purpose text editor, the SCAP workbench
editor, the eSCAPe editor, the Benchmark Editor and the Recommendation Tracker were
compared. Based on the obtained information, a new editor design was proposed in the
fourth chapter with the aim to fill in the gap between general purpose editors and editors
for the SCAP content editing.
Since the iterative software development model was chosen, the implemented solution
slightly differs from the proposed design because of the fixes for problems, which arose
during the implementation phase. The orientation on the scap-security-guide project was
prioritized, which influenced the strategy chosen for dealing with the size of the XML files
containing the SCAP content as well as the editor name. The editor was named scap-
security-guide-editor (SSGE) and the version implemented as part of this thesis can be
downloaded as SSGE 1.0 from the fedorahosted.org website1.
There was an compromise made in order to deliver the maximum functionality to users
in the limited amount of time. The support for the XCCDF as well as for the OVAL format
was implemented, but the mean of delivering to users was changed. The solution was
designed as a web service, but by the end of the implementation phase a decision to pack
the editor into a RPM package was made. This solution prevented many problems that
would have to be solved otherwise, so the remaining time it saved was used for implementing
the OVAL support. With the OVAL support, the implemented editor can be used as the
single tool for creating new content in the scap-security-guide project. The disadvantage of
the decision of shipping the editor in the form of an RPM package is that additional steps
are required on the side of users. The users will have to install the RPM package and run
the editor in order to use it.
The thesis contains an overview of the SCAP XCCDF and OVAL standards, SCAP
content producing projects as well as state-of-the-art editors for the XCCDF and OVAL
formats. Its main contribution is the scap-security-guide-editor. The implemented version
is currently available to the general public. Without studying the standards and testing of
1https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide-editor/
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existing tool, the new editor design could not have been created.
The implementation of SSGE is planned to be continued in the near future. First of
all, the implementation of the already designed Apache integration is planned. The Apache
integration is a prerequisite to providing the editor as a web service. This will also imply the
need to solve the possible concurrent access to the local scap-security-guide git repository
clone, which might happen when multiple users try to modify the same file at the same
time. Another high-priority development item is the creation of the Selinux context for the
SSGE application. The SSGE is written using the Flask framework, which supports the
Apache integration using the WSGI interface [7]. In order to be able to provide SSGE in
the form of a web service, the SSGE application has to maintain the local clone of the SSG
git repository, having the write access to the repository clone. Such behavior of a Python
web application might require changes to the default Selinux context.
The testing of SSGE 1.0 revealed a bug which was fixed and resulted in a number of
feature requests. The most important of them is the ability to provide a patch with all
changes applied to multiple files. The Get Patch button should be available only after
changes have been made and a preview of the changes might be available. Other planned
features include the Undo and Redo buttons, moving the cursor position outside of the
current tag when the Add Rule/Group button is clicked, calculating the size of the main
editor text area from the window size and offering a mailto link for submitting the changes
to the scap-security-guide project mailing list. The future plans include support for more
comfortable editing of the XCCDF profiles as well as features simplifying the creation of
entries in the CPE format. The above is the list of features currently planned for future
implementation, there are no other future plans, but requests for enhancements as well as
bug reports are expected to be filed by users. Conformance to the XCCDF and OVAL
format was not verified, so bugs reporting behavior inconsistent with the standards might
be reported.
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Appendix A
Manual
Following is the content of the README file supplied together with the scap-security-guide-
editor and also available on the SSGE page on the fedorahosted.org community website.
A.1 Using the editor
Start the editor by the ssge command if you installed the rpm or running ssge/ssge.py if
downloaded the code. When started for the first time, the SSGE will clone scap-security-
guide git repository to /.scap-security-guide-git. This repository clone should be
used by the SSGE tool only. If you need local clone of scap-security-guide git repository
for any other purposes, clone it somewhere else since your changes would be discarded by
the editor. When git clone is completed, you should see output like
* Running on http://0.0.0.0:4444/
The SSGE is now running on your computer. To start working with the editor, open
http://localhost:4444/ address in your web browser.
A.1.1 Mode selector
The mode selector page is the start screen of the SSGE. The first part is dedicated to
scap-security-guide XCCDF files. You can select XCCDF file from the git repository and
open in in the editor. If you select a file and hit the Delete button, you’ll receive a patch
deleting selected file. You can also create new XCCDF file in one of existing directories.
After pressing the Create new button, the new file dialogue is displayed. On the new file
screen, you have to select name for the new file and choose directory, in which the new file
will be created. Then editor with the new file template is displayed.
The second section of the mode selector screen works the same way the first does, but
it’s used for scap-security-guide OVAL files. In the last section, you can simply upload any
XCCDF or OVAL file from your computer and edit it in the editor.
A.1.2 Editor
The editor page is the main screen of the scap-security-guide-editor. The main part is the
textarea containing the file being edited. There are several options accessible in form of
buttons located at the bottom of the editor screen. The options available are dependent on
currently edited content, the above example screenshot was taken when editing an XCCDF
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file from scap-security-guide git. The leftmost button is used for obtaining result of editing.
When editing file from git, it gives a patch against git HEAD. Such patch can be sent to
scap-security-guide mailing list for review and inclusion or directly applied and committed.
When editing uploaded custom file, this button gives the whole modified file.
The Validate button will perform openscap validation of the currently edited content.
If user custom file is being edited, it’s validated directly. If an XCCDF or OVAL file from
git is being edited, the result file is being built first and then validated. It’s not possible
to validate just the piece of content currently being edited since it does not comply with
the standards. This is the reason, why you sometimes can see make failures on validation
attempt.
Note for Fedora 18 and newer users: Content validation currently does not work with
libxslt-1.1.27 and newer due to 1. Downgrading libxslt to 1.1.26 is a workaround until this
problem is fixed by scap-security-guide developers.
The Close button just brings you back to mode selector screen. When editing an
XCCDF file, there are ’Add Rule’ and ’Add Group’ buttons available. These buttons helps
with adding corresponding tags by generating minimal Rule/Group template at the cursor
position upon pressing.
The scap-security-guide-editor has feature of autocompletion for XCCDF as well as
OVAL formats. This feature is accessible for child elements, element attributes and OVAL
id references within scap-security-guide project. After pressing ’<’, ’ ’ (space bar) and ’=’
(only for id attribute of the oval tag) keys, a suggestion pop-up menu is displayed, when
available. For the possible suggestions, short help is displayed on mouse hover, as shown
on above example.
1http://www.mail-archive.com/scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org/msg02140.html
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Appendix B
Contents of the attached CD
Directories with following contents can be found on the attached CD.
• src – A directory containing all the source code files.
• RPMs – A directory containing the created RPM package, SRPM package and the
archive with the source code.
• text – A directory containing the LATEX source files of this paper.
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